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generational cut-offs in designing 
intergenerational policy; people in similar 
circumstances may well face different 
obligations or exemptions. Yet, as evidenced 
by the highlighted downsides in the above 
example, this may be a necessary cost of 
introducing and sustaining a policy that is 
expected to produce a net societal benefit. 
It is a rare policy that leaves everybody 
winning and nobody losing. 
Conclusion
It is clear that New Zealand faces a large 
housing issue, one that is intergenerational 
in cause and can also be intergenerational in 
solution. Capital taxation inconsistencies, 
caused by the 1989 tax changes that 
created an intergenerational transfer from 
younger to older generations, along with 
infrastructure issues have contributed 
significantly to the house price problem 
and land taxes are a potential option to 
address this issue. Yet land taxes do not 
come without their perceived deficiencies. 
Nevertheless, the contribution of such 
interventions to intergenerational equity, 
despite not being ideal, may help overcome 
some of these objections, towards restoring 
house prices to more affordable levels. 
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New Zealand’s distortionary tax environment for housing imposes large 
costs on young people. Since 1989, New Zealand has taxed owner-occupied 
housing more lightly than other forms of capital income. In contrast, 
retirement savings have been taxed heavily. This combination has created 
a bias towards owner-occupied housing, encouraging homeowners to live 
in higher quality properties than they would under a neutral tax system, 
and bid up the price of land located near desirable amenities. 
While existing, often older homeowners have enjoyed high land and 
house values, our generation has faced artificially inflated house prices. 
Distortionary capital income taxation has contributed to New Zealand’s 
housing affordability crisis. 
Forms of capital income taxation
Capital income can be taxed on three bases: 
exempt-exempt-tax (EET), tax-exempt-
exempt (TEE) (both expenditure taxes), 
and tax-tax-exempt (TTE) (an income 
tax). Most OECD countries adopt an EET 
scheme for retirement savings. Under this 
scheme, income is not taxed when it is 
earned or accumulating in a retirement 
savings fund, but instead taxed when the 
balance is withdrawn at retirement. 
Owner-occupied housing in New 
Zealand is taxed on a TEE basis. This means 
income used to purchase a house is taxed 
when it is earned, but imputed rent and 
capital gains are not taxed. New Zealand 
taxes retirement savings in KiwiSaver, 
rental properties, shares and other assets 
on a TTE basis. This means income is taxed 
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when it is earned and as it accumulates, but 
not when it is withdrawn and spent. To tax 
capital income neutrally, a country needs 
to tax retirement income accounts on a 
TTE basis, tax all capital gains on an accrual 
basis, and tax the imputed rent from 
owner-occupied housing (Coleman, 2017).
Taxation of KiwiSaver
The income tax treatment of KiwiSaver 
significantly reduces the returns individuals 
receive from saving. Income taxes impose 
a greater tax on future consumption 
relative to current consumption, creating 
a bias towards current consumption 
and discouraging saving. This effect is 
exacerbated when the compound returns 
from an individual’s KiwiSaver account 
occur over a long period, as is the case with 
young people (Neilson, 2018).
The inflation component of interest 
income is also taxed. As a result, real interest 
earnings are taxed at above nominal rates. 
Taken together, an individual with an 
effective 28% prescribed investor rate (PIR) 
who saves for 50 years in KiwiSaver would 
pay an effective tax rate of 58% (Financial 
Services Council, 2013). Indeed, taxes saved 
over a lifetime as a percentage of retirement 
saving contributions in New Zealand are 
the second lowest in the OECD (OECD, 
2018). This makes KiwiSaver relatively 
unattractive compared to investment in 
owner-occupied housing.
Consequences of New Zealand’s tax 
treatment for owner-occupied housing
The expenditure taxation of owner-
occupied housing since 1989 has 
incentivised owners to bid up the price of 
land located near desirable amenities. It 
has also encouraged households to live in 
houses that are approximately 25% higher 
quality than under a neutral tax system. 
The size of newly constructed housing 
was stable from 1980 to 1988, then 
increased sharply after the 1989 tax 
changes, and much faster than in Australia 
or the United States (Coleman, 2017). This 
evidence aligns with the theoretical 
literature. Feldstein (1977) showed that tax 
incentives favouring housing are capitalised 
into higher house values, reducing the 
welfare of future generations. 
An example helps to explain how the 
tax system incentivises owners to bid up 
the price of housing. I am willing to pay 
$20,000 extra to live in Thorndon instead 
of Lower Hutt. Thorndon is close to my job 
and other activities I enjoy doing, with the 
added benefit of less money and time spent 
on transport. How much more I am willing 
to pay to live in Thorndon is inversely 
related to interest rates. If interest rates 
were 4%, I would pay $500,000 to get a 
$20,000 benefit. $500,000 would be the 
capitalised land value under a neutral 
income tax system. However, under New 
Zealand’s non-neutral tax system, this value 
is capitalised into an amount approximately 
twice as high for conveniently located land 
(Coleman, 2017). This is particularly 
evident in Wellington, where a low supply 
of conveniently located land has led to 
students and young professionals struggling 
to find a suitable place to live.
Older New Zealanders have enjoyed 
higher house prices, which are likely to be 
at least partly attributable to New Zealand’s 
distortionary tax system. The literature and 
empirical evidence demonstrate that young 
people have continued to face artificially 
high house prices. New Zealand is the only 
country with an EET scheme for owner-
occupied housing and a TTE scheme for 
retirement savings. Virtually all other 
OECD countries have an EET scheme for 
retirement savings (OECD, 2018). 
There is no evidence that New Zealand’s 
capital income taxation is not harming 
young people. On the contrary, it is 
increasingly difficult for young people to 
buy their first home. Even if we address 
supply issues and other problems which 
contribute to high house prices, the tax 
system will continue to impose significant 
costs on young people. Tax system reform 
would address the intergenerational 
inequity of the 1989 tax changes.
How can we address this issue?
Returning to expenditure treatment of 
KiwiSaver would best address the root 
cause of the tax distortion, and in turn 
reduce house prices. EET treatment of 
KiwiSaver would provide individuals 
with another tax-advantaged investment, 
reducing the bias towards owner-occupied 
housing. This could incentivise people to 
hold more income in KiwiSaver instead 
of saving in other ways, such as through 
a business. 
In a scheme where all capital income is 
taxed at the same rate, this would represent 
a new distortion. However, as the 
government currently taxes capital income 
at different rates, an EET scheme could 
reduce the proportion of capital income 
taxed at very high rates by improving 
average pre-tax returns (Coleman, 2019). 
An expenditure tax regime for KiwiSaver 
could reduce the demand for housing and 
house prices, without sacrificing economic 
efficiency.
In a scenario where house prices fall by 
15% due to an EET scheme for KiwiSaver, 
renters and owner-occupiers with limited 
equity would save on rent and mortgage 
interest costs. Assume a house costs 
$600,000, and its value appreciates at 1% 
each year. Under a TTE scheme, a renter 
pays $23,428 in rent (Coleman, 2017). An 
owner-occupier with 50% equity pays 
$15,000 in mortgage interest. If an EET 
scheme reduced the price of this house to 
$510,000, the renter would pay $19,914, 
while the owner-occupier would pay 
$10,838. This is a 15% decrease in housing 
costs for the renter, and a 28% decrease for 
the owner-occupier. 
This fall in housing costs would make 
it feasible for young people to find suitable 
housing. An EET scheme may be seen as 
regressive (Savings Working Group, 2010). 
Higher income people would 
disproportionately benefit from the 
reduction in tax rates, as they are normally 
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able to save more of their income. However, 
low- to middle-income earners are less 
likely to be able to invest in lightly taxed 
assets such as housing, and more likely to 
invest in highly taxed KiwiSaver accounts 
(Coleman, 2019). As an EET scheme would 
reduce tax on KiwiSaver, it may be less 
regressive than initially thought.
The transition to an EET scheme needs 
to be effectively managed. The government 
would experience an initial fall in tax 
revenue, as it would not receive any revenue 
when income is first placed into KiwiSaver, 
nor from compounding returns. However, 
these costs would be offset by the tax 
revenue received when individuals 
withdraw their balances (Coleman, 2019). 
This transitional cost could be managed by 
borrowing more or removing the member 
tax credit (Inland Revenue, 2020). 
Additionally, a limit on maximum 
contributions should be set to manage the 
fiscal cost of the scheme (Tax Working 
Group, 2018). This will prevent high-
income individuals investing all their funds 
in KiwiSaver to enjoy its tax-advantaged 
status. 
To reduce transitional costs, only those 
born after a certain date could be eligible 
to receive expenditure taxation of KiwiSaver 
(Coleman, 2019). For example, only those 
born after 1986 could be eligible for 
expenditure taxation to reflect the average 
first home purchase age of 31–34 (Wilkes, 
2019). Anyone born before 1986 would 
continue to fall under the old TTE scheme. 
This would prevent older homeowners 
benefiting from higher house prices as well 
as more generous retirement income tax 
treatment.
Young people have borne the brunt of 
the artificially high house prices the tax 
system has contributed to. Homeowners 
have built larger, higher-quality houses, and 
bid up the price of conveniently located 
land. The tax-advantaged status of owner-
occupied housing relative to KiwiSaver has 
incentivised this. 
No other country has followed in New 
Zealand’s footsteps after the 1989 tax 
changes, recognising the significant costs 
this system imposes on young people. 
Returning to expenditure treatment of 
KiwiSaver would be the most direct way to 
address this issue, as it would provide 
another tax-advantaged savings vehicle. A 
cap on maximum contributions and 
eligibility based on birth date would help 
to reduce the fiscal costs of transitioning to 
this scheme. Reforming capital income 
taxation is crucial to reducing house prices 
so more young people can purchase their 
first home.
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